Introduction
The concept of anti-social behaviour (ASB) was a product of New Labour's 'third way' thinking, yet concepts of disorder and incivility, which have a strong interrelationship with the idea of anti-social behaviour, have a long tradition in English sensibilities and civil law. This is nowhere more obvious than in the regulation of alcohol and entertainment.
The earliest law concerning alcohol was passed in 1381, but was aimed merely at the regulation of price to prevent inflation and the cheapening of the coinage (Dorn, 1983) .
Statutes dating from the fifteenth century established a connection between the consumption of alcohol and labour discipline. As Nicolas Dorn (1983) and Brian Harrison (1994) argued, alcohol consumption was identified from this point onwards with lax attendance and productivity, political agitation amongst the working-class, riots, disorder and revolution.
Drinking and entertainment were seen as a barrier to a longer more regular working week and the intensification of work required by industrialisation. Legislation throughout the early to mid-seventeeth century dictated where and when drinking could take place, ranging from restricting drinking in Inns to residents, banning entertainment on religious days and making drunkenness an offence (Dorn, 1983) .
Drink and entertainment, therefore, has, in English history, held a symbolic meaning, speaking to a discussion about the nature of a newly emerging industialized society, class formation, and political agitation. This chapter will explore this symbolism, firstly focussing on the emergence and formation of licensing law in history, secondly of New Labour and Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition policy in relation to alcohol consumption.
George Orwell (1940: 41) pointed to the hypocrisy embedded in English licensing laws that were 'designed to interfere with everybody but in practice allowed everything to happen.' I will argue that beyond the rhetoric, Orwell's description is indeed correct; elites in England and Wales were not so concerned about alcohol and entertainment to prohibit both, although they may be forced to respond to particular health campaigns (Vleugels 2014), or for other self-serving reasons. However, licensing law has served governance well in certain instances of threat and needful social engineering where it has been enforced. This chapter will explore the contradictions of licensing law in its historical emergence and post 1997, and how and when it is enforced. To this end we might reframe Orwells quote that licensing law is 'designed to interfere with some but in practice allowed most things to happen, under a symbolic criminalisation of all.'
These two themes -symbolism and contradictory motivation and enforement -runs throughout this chapter. It will begin by exploring the rationale of licensing law as it emerged in conjunction with the slow developing industrialisation of England and Wales. It will in this section provide case studies of selective enforcement. The chapter will then move on to consider the reframing of alcohol regulation and its symbolism in the New Labour government and beyond. The argument of this chapter is that legislation enacted around concepts of disorder and anti-social behaviour not only serve to regulate individual and group conduct, but also relationships between capital and state.
Symbolism and licensing practice in the regulation of alcohol and entertainment in the eigteenth and nineteenth century
This chapter has already outlined some of the early symbolism of alchol consumption and its relationship to concepts of anti-social behaviour and disorder. Licensing regimes and the official attitude to alcohol have been shaped by economic, as well as political and moral considerations.
Attempts to restrict the consumption of alcohol from the sixteenth century, for example, were closely connected with the new vagrancy laws aimed at controlling labour and ensuring discipline, alongside concerns about the close connection of Alehouses with working-class radicalism (Dorn, 1983) . Furthermore, theorists have understood fears around nightlife and popular culture to be intimately connected to fears about the 'dangerous classes' in the rapidly growing cities from the eighteenth century (Schlör, 1998) . The social reaction to this culture was organized by largely middle-class movements ranging from the Reformation of Manners Movement (Hunt, 1999) to the Temperance movement in Victorian England, aimed at introducing a (presumed absence) of manners and civility 1 into the poor by reforming their conduct (Dingle, 1980 (Dorn, 1983) . The way that licensing law reflected such practices of inclusion and exclusion in the ability to control outlets for alcohol consumption and entertainment often coincided with the interests of the breweries and ensured cooperation and 'self-regulation.'
Any entertainment that fell outside of the bourgeois economy ('fairs and festivals') were treated as potential sites for incivility and disorder and targeted for surveillance by the emerging police forces (Storch, 1976) . The aim of the first entertainment licensing law, the Disorderly Houses Act 1752, was to permit and restrict, so long as the authorities retained control over the premises. What is central here is that licensing law, whether aimed at deregulation or re-regulation depending on the historical period, had the impact of consolidating the permitted capitalist industry. Free or unregulated activities outside of that industry were successively restricted. The differtiations made were cultural ones. For example, the apparent difficulty of distinguishing between places frequented by the upper classes as opposed to the lower classes was exemplified in the Disorderly Houses Act 1752 through a clause which stated that a premises did not need a licence if it were an important theatre (with specific places listed in the text), or were already licensed by the crown or Lord Chamberlain.
More recently, the fate of the 'beat clubs' in London's West End and Manchester in the 1960s, closed because of the so-called 'moral dangers' to young people (Public Records, 1964 HO300/24; Lee, 1995) and the domestication of the rave scene in the 1990s are also indicative of these dual standards.
The industry was often compliant with respect to regulatory controls for entirely strategic reasons, which belied the prevailing ideology of the laissez-faire market. For example, between 1890 and 1900 the industry saw a drop in revenue due to falling sales and prices. As a consequence, a struggle to control retail outlets ensued. An industry in fierce competition then favoured the closure of a number of outlets, which accorded with the growing Temperance mood of regulators (Dorn, 1983) . Further, licensing law has flowed from the nature of economic policy. During the twentieth century, the trade was defined by the eroding boundaries of capital and state. Andy Lovatt (1996) referred to a 'Fordist' mode of regulation where the state regulated supply, by restricting the number of public houses and hours of opening. This form of regulation persisted until the 1980s with the growth of laissez-faire economics (Baggott, 1990) and renewed support for the liberalization of the trade. Yet, whatever constellation of licensing law was proposed, the result was a differentiation made between permitted and non-permitted industry.
The ability to mediate this differentiation derived from the structure of licensing law and its institutional implementation. As Webb and Webb (1903: 4) seen as superfluous alehouses (Webb and Webb, 1903: 6) . The third power came from a combination of the first two, and before the Beer Act 1830 magistrates had total autonomy to impose conditions, such as closing times, the number of licensed venues in areas, where public houses could be situated in the locality and so on (Webb and Webb, 1903: 9) .
These three basic powers have been negotiated and altered in different historical periods depending on prevailing opinion. As already mentioned, in a unique drawing back of statute law, the Beer Act 1830 restricted judicial discretion, specifying that it was limited to making sure the applicant was of good character. The power of withdrawal was placed within the jury system, and Parliament argued significantly that the publican should be free to do whatever Parliament had not expressly forbidden (Webb and Webb, 1903: 98) . The consequences of this liberaliszation was that the number of retailers of liquor grew, and as fears spiralled with regard to the growing level of drunkenness and incivility, magistrates and bishops agitated for a repeal of the Act. In the winter of 1830, a Parliamentary Committee was formed led by James Silk; the Committee was Temperance in character, and the following Beerhouse Acts of 1834 and 1840 enhanced the powers of the justices' with regard to the owners 'qualities.' Despite these shifts and reversals, the basic structure of licensing law and the powers granted to the state to control places of drinking remain similar to the structure of law today; further, that these specificities of quasi-legal practice embedded in licensing law conferred the ability of magistrates and other empowered authorities to control and differentiate between cultural and social spaces.
It is obviously the case that both liquor and entertainment licensing law have mutated beyond their original form. It is also the case that the development of police forces in the nineteenth century significantly enhanced the power of the state to enforce law and moreover develop alternative routes to controlling popular entertainment and incivility, such as direct repression and surveillance (Storch, 1976) . Much of the langauage has changed whilst the symbolism has become more muted. Regardless, the licensing of alcohol and entertainment follows basically the same principles outlined by the Webbs, that is, a system of control aimed at controlling or containing the conditions of supply and of selecting who is a 'fit and proper'
person to be licensed.
The state itself has historically, and continues to be, in the contraditory position of modulating different interests whilst displacing blame. As illustrated by Dorn (1983) , the production and consumption of alcohol has been subject to the twin political forces of freemarketeers and Victorian Temperance (and its predecessors). The working-class itself acts as a mass market for the consumption of alcohol (Gofton, 1990) , particularly given as Harrison points out, the psychological strains of industialization combined with an erosion of of 'traditional sanctions on conduct' (1994: 41) predispose people to over-consumption. What can never be admitted by governance is an economic and cultural causation; thus inividualsdrinkers and licensees -are blamed for its socially deliterius effects, an early example of a responsibilization (Rose, 1999) agenda. Licensing law -with its supervisory and differentiating possibilities -has been innovated to contain these contraditions.
New Labour and beyond: consumption, anti-social behaviour and disorder
New Labour thinking on alcohol and licensing emerged in policy form with a report from the Better Regulation Task Force 1998, which advocated the rationalization of existing licensing law.
The result of this report and subsequent consultations was the Licensing Act 2003. The Act proposed to 'liberalize' hours of opening by allowing licensees to apply for differentiated hours within a structure of considerations about the effect on crime and disorder, nuisances and antisocial behaviour, public safety and the protection of children. It aimed to release the burdens on 'responsible' businesses, whilst retaining a range of sanctions against 'irresponsible' ones; thus the legislation was firmly couched in New Labour's 'third way' politics, balancing rights and responsibilities (Talbot, 2006) . It was also explicity aimed at engineering particular forms of cultures over others; the purpose of this supposed liberalization was to create a 'cafe society' Of course disorder, like anti-social behaviour, 3 is a concept that can 'mean anything, while also being a strongly symbolic and evocative term' (Brown, 2004: 204) , and generally studies cited in order prove a correlation between alcohol and disorder actually have a more narrow focus on violence or aggression (see Alcohol Concern, 2004; Finney, 2004) . The diffuse nature of the social reaction permitted by this terminology recalled some elements of a moral panic (Borsay, 2007) and historically common fears concerning the entertainment habits of the lower orders, women, and minority ethnic groups (Erenburg, 1981; Kohn, 1992) .
Efforts to direct attention towards the (mostly Northern) disorderly binge drinker being produced by the excesses of the Licensing Act 2003 ignored some salient facts about government economic and social policy. One is that the deregulation of licensing hours that began with the end of the afternoon break (where pubs closed after lunch until early evening) in the mid 1980s (Baggott, 1990 ) was part of a broader ideological commitment to laissez-faire economics and deindustrialization initiated much earlier than the New Labour government. The second is consequential from the first, that the night-time economy was an idea born out of the need to regenerate decaying inner-city areas (Department of the Environment, 1993). Nightlife would be an economic driver as part of a service driven sector of symbolic goods that would dominate our post-modern and post-Fordist landscape. A third aspect is also key, and that is to remind ourselves that the night-time economy was a policy of social control aimed at driving rave culture into private and licensed space, thus rendering them visible and ordered (Garratt, 1998; Collin, 1997) . One consequence of this was that at least officially the intoxicant of choice had to be legal, that is, alcoholic, despite the continued prevalence of illegal drugs Moreover, black licensees were simply not viewed as trustworthy or commercially competent by the police or even local authorites (who might be expected to take a more enlightened view, but who were reliant on police warnings and objections). The regulation of licensing therefore coalesces with cultural regeneration strategies to ultimately favour big business over independent or alternative spaces, or white controlled spaces over those owned by black licensees, and so on in a complex process that intertwines moral norms and cultural habits with commercial development. These observations reconfirm geographical research on culturally differentiating processes occurring within cities in the context of 'gentrification' (Zukin 1989 (Zukin , 1991 (Zukin , 1995 Smith, 1996; Ferrell, 2001; Davis, 1990) .
If New Labour policy represented the ambiguity of the 'third way' approach in that it tried to balance the 'free market' and 'consumerism' against social engineering, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Goverment which came to power in 2010 represented a hardening of a more free market, 'choice'-led ideology, although it took some time to emerge.
In the immediate sense, the rhetoric of condeming binge drinkers and disorder, with 'tough action' against irresponsible licensees continued. The Coalition's alcohol strategy, produced by (Scotland) Act 2010 over fears that it contravened European Union (EU) price competition rules (Nicholls, 2011) . In addition, it has been noted that the government has fostered close links to the drinks industry in line with its libertarian, laissez-faire leanings (Sheron, Hawkey and Gilmore, 2011) . Research comissioned by the British Medical Journal (Gornall, 2014) has found that the government was intensively lobbied by supermarkets, breweries and right-wing research institutes, such as the Institute of Economic Affairs, while public health experts were excluded, even as minimum pricing was being consolidated into policy. Enacted under the ideology of the free-market and choice, the outcome illustrates that -with the close cooperation of the state and business -the 'free market' is anything but free. Nevertheless, powers still prevail to target individually 'unacceptable' premises, whilst providing an environment of tolerance for the activities of big business.
Conclusion
This chapter has put forward the argument that the regulation of alcohol and entertainment mediated through licensing law and other indirect legislation has a strong symbolic quality of criminalization, while in practice creating the means to discriminate between acceptable and unacceptable cultural forms and behaviour. This tells us much about the nature of the 'freemarket' both at particuar historical junctures such as the Victorian period and today. A historical and current consideration of legislation concerned with the regulation of anti-social behaviour and disorder shows that it aims to regulate both conduct and provide a means to discriminate between 'acceptable' and 'unacceptable' business, a process of regulation that big business is involved in and benefits from. What does this mean for the nature of drinking alcohol and what we might broadly think of as subcultural (meaning those that may be designated unacceptable) spaces?
Orwell noted in his sentimental account of English culture that the working-class were 'inveterate gamblers, drink as much beer as their wages will permit, are devoted to bawdy jokes, and use probably the foulest language in the world ' (1940: 16) . There is something to be said for understanding drinking cultures in this context; yes, excessive drinking is driven by the nature of capitalist economies, whether this is about expanding markets or alienation. However, there is also something in Fielding's lament that the English are too attached to liberty. Nightlife historically is both an expression of the separation of work and pleasure characteristic of market and industrialized societies and, because of the dominance of class segregation and the official response to popular culture, a form of rebellion, conceived in its broadest (a-political) sense.
There are doubts about the efficacy of control. Peter Ackroyd (2000) , in his 'biography' of London, describes the unruly and disorderly nature of everyday life in a capital city; its very size eludes attempts at control and sanitization (Raban, 1974) . Free market ideology has its reflection in contemporary popular culture.
While in this conclusion I have noted both the perverse effects of free market thinking and the limits of intervention, it seems useful to consider how nightlife can be a source of creativity, and how urban policy and licensing law might facilitate diversity in urban landscapes irrespective of the multiplicity of concerns about health and disorder. This in particular means a better understanding about the relationship between regulation and more subcultural forms of expression, which have often been at the forefront of reshaping economic, cultural and political agendas, aptly seen in places as geographically diverse as Manchester and Brixton (London). In
Brixton (Talbot, 2004) , Manchester (Böse, 2005) , or through mass events like raves where alternative culture was able to express itself in a spatial form, the possibilities of encountering the 'Other' -whether this be an expression of class, ethnic, gender or other forms of difference -were high (Sennett, 1970 , Raban, 1974 . The impact of such encounters was both a challenge to conventional identities and the assertion of mainstream values such as work or family (Pryce, 1976; Willis, 1978) . Transgressive spaces and behaviour were at the same time destructive and creative, allowing for personal dissipation, internalized and externalized violence and vandalism, but also opening a space for cultural and political expression (Lessing, 1969) . The importance of understanding the dynamic of subculture, emergent in disciplines such as cultural criminology, appears key.
While what we have today seems far removed from those possibilities, it seems important not to close them down for the future. Current debates and policies around alcohol-related disorder and anti-social behaviour, as simplistic policy discourses, have served to expand the scope of regulatory control and police powers; while we imagine they are aimed at unwanted behaviours, they also have negative consequences for alternative spaces and subcultural expression. In making nightlife a 'law and order' issue, the prospect of night spaces being inhabited by subcultural entrepreneurs becomes narrower. The colonization and control of nightlife, alongside the moral disapproval about its behaviours, will not aid the potential for the recreation of a more interesting and creative nightlife and politics. 
Abstract
The aim of this chapter is to examine the concept of `alcohol-related disorder and anti-social behaviour (ASB) in nightlife in the eighteenth century and Victorian era, alongside the reform of licensing post-1997, as a notion that reflects the broader impact of economic, social and cultural influences on nightlife. The chapter draws on legislative and policy frameworks from 1751 which demonstrate that the regulation of nightlife has, since the earliest licensing statute, been concerned with consolidating big business and marginalizing alternative or perceived unacceptable cultures and behaviours, a precedent that continue with New Labour and the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government. The argument is made that, rather than focusing on nightlife as an undifferentiated social problem, researchers should look more broadly at the cultural, spatial and regulatory barriers facing a creative, diverse and free nightlife. 
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